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The Eventual Decline of Empirical Law and
Economics
Saul Levmoret
This Essay suggests the necessity of a co-evolutionaryprocess among
empiricaland theoreticaladvances in law and economics. Empiricalwork
alone is suggestive, but should not be taken too seriously. The weaknesses
in empirical work, and by this Imostly mean regression-basedwork which
has come to dominate law and economics, lead to a kind of virus that begins with over-statementsandmisapprehensions,and then spreadsas more
scholars copy the mistakes and engage in empirical work as a means of
entry into the field Regression-basedwork will become suspect as its current assumptions are questioned, and as replication failures reveal its
weaknesses. Empirical work in law and economics looks very different
when underlying distributions are not easily probed with regressions but
are understoodas reflectingpower-laws, oras simplyrandom. Once inconvenient distributionsare acknowledged, the key question is why observations might be distributedin this fashion. This is likely to be a task for theorists as law and economics enters its next phase. On the other hand,
empirical work has been importantandhasmade law and economics a respectable science. The claim here is thatgood empirical work-especially
in law and economics-is hardto produce, andit is importantnot to overvalue its products. Moreover, it is more useful when combined with good
theory.
The focus in this Essay is on three weaknesses of empirical work,
though in a largersense most of the problemscome from omitted variables
and, in some cases, insufficientlylarge data sets. First, much of the empirical work in law and economicsis driven by models thatrely on errorminimization techniques, and these techniques are unreliable when errorsare
surprisinglyand unevenly distributed(that is, when they suffer from heteroscedasticity). Second, itislikely that when empiricistsconnect data with
a model, the process is flawed because there might be a hidden transition
to a second distribution. Discoveringmultiple distributionsis likely to require theoretical work. These and otherproblems are exacerbated by the
likelihoodthat conclusionsare basedon the tailend of datasets, inasmuch
as scholarlyjournals only bring to light statisticallysignificantresults. In
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addition, empirical work in law and economics suffers from the absence of
sizeable datasets. Without such sets it is difficult to test conclusions andto
escape the omnipresent challenge of omitted variables. Reversal paradoxes are yet anotherseriousproblem, and especially so in the absence of
large data sets.
The largerand more optimistic claim is that data and theory can and
must work together. Regressions have come to play a criticalrole in law
andeconomics, andeconometricmethods have improved over time. It has
become apparentthat data can suggest theories, andtheories can be tested,
to a degree, with data. But some theoreticalinsights areso convincing that
data testing, though comforting even when flawed, may be unnecessaryandit may, in any event, be taintedby the spreadof the theory. It is likely
that empiricalwork in law and economics will find itselfin retreat, even as
its qualityimproves because of renewed attention to theory.
Introduction ......................................................................................... 613
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Inconvenient Distributions.............................................................616
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Introduction
This Essay will not be the first to emphasize the weakness of empirical
work that is not motivated by theory.' My larger aim is to stress and predict
the continuing co-evolution of these two strands of law and economics.2
Along the way, I develop several themes. First, and perhaps most controversial, is the idea that a great deal of empirical work in law and economics
(as in other fields) is suggestive, but is not to be taken too seriously. Indeed,
I predict that the replication crisis, best associated with psychology, will
soon find its way to law and economics.3 The weaknesses in empirical work,
1.

See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW

SCIENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (2018); Richard N. Boyd, On the CurrentStatus of the Issue of
Scientific Realism, 19 ERKENNTNIS 45 (1983); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Measurement Without Theory, 29 REV. ECON. & STAT. 161 (1947). By "theory" I mean something interesting that explains
how a part of the world works.
2.
For a general discussion on the early development of empirical legal scholarship, see
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of EmpiricalLegal Scholarship:JudicialDecision

Making and the NewEmpiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 820.
3.

See Scott E. Maxwell, Michael Y. Lau & George S. Howard, Is Psychology Suffering

from a Replication Crisis? What Does "Failure to Replicate" Really Mean?, 70 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 487 (2015). Replication crises are not limited to psychology. There is good reason
to think that most of the social sciences and many of the hard sciences are replete with
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by which I usually mean regression-based work that is dominant in law and
economics, are a kind of virus that begins with over-statements and misapprehensions and then spreads as scholars copy the mistakes of their predecessors, and construct more regressions as a means of entry into the field.
Good empirical work is simply hard to do, and we need to be aware of its
limitations. I focus on three weaknesses of empirical work in a field that
rarely has the luxury of large data sets. First, much of the empirical work
in law and economics is driven by models that are formed by error minimization techniques, and these techniques are unreliable when errors are surprisingly and unevenly distributed (that is, when they suffer from heteroscedasticity), as is likely to be the case when the true distribution of
variables is not normal, but instead conforms to a power law, to one of
various sigmoid (convex and then concave, s-curve) functions, or reflects
midstream changes from one distribution to another, including a segment
of randomness. I aim to show that while empiricists like to say that "some
data is better than no data," the seemingly obvious reliance or insistence
on data-driven analysis, is misplaced or even reckless, because there is often reason to think that "some data" often leads to misleading conclusions.
As we will see, omitted variables are at the root of the problem. Most empiricists are of aware of this problem, but the problem is insufficiently appreciated, and the responses to it come with problems of their own.
The weaknesses commonly encountered in empirical work reflect the
well-known difficulty of moving from correlations to claims of causation.
Great strides have been made in recent times, in what is known as the "causation revolution," to bridge this gap,4 but much of the work has relied
upon, or at least been made easier with, linear models. Linearity is often a
convenient rather than a supportable assumption, as explained in Part I.
At times the assumption of linearity does little harm because there are natural or clever experiments available, random sampling may be possible,
and enough data is available to test predictions. This is done by setting
aside some unseen data, or at least dividing it by predicting future developments, in ways that reduce the likelihood that omitted variables do the
work.5 Testing regressions on set aside data can be seen as a kind of internal replication. Ideally, and especially in law and economics, insights are
based on theories. Theories about why correlations are found lead to predictions and tests. Put differently, econometrics is a game of looking for
treatment effects, but doing so requires that the groups being compared
are truly comparable, so that the groups are exchangeable and attention
can be focused on the variable being studied. In practice, there is a
unreproducible, inconsistent, published, and oft-cited, studies. See Alvaro de Menard, What's
Wrong with SocialScience andHow to FixIt:Reflections After Reading2578 Papers,FANTASTIC
ANACHRONISM (Sep. 11, 2020), https://fantasticanachronism.com/2020/09/11/whats-wrong-withsocial-science-and-how-to-fix-it [https://perma.cc/F9VA-TKJR].
4.
PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 9.

5.
See id; Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, The Impact of ArtificialIntelligence on Rules,
Standards, andJudicialDiscretion, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2019).
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persistent problem of pollution by omitted variables. In some fields, randomized experiments with a large number of observations solve this problem. This is normally impossible in law and economics.
Part II then suggests a second problem that persists even if we can
overcome the inconvenience of non-linearity. It must often be the case that
what appears as one phenomenon, with empiricists striving to describe it
with one line or curve, is really best described with two or more distributions-and perhaps theories. Readers might think of this as a subset, or
extreme version, of the problem of omitted variables, the mainstay of the
discussion in Part I, but it is useful to think of it as a separate matter. In
passing, the discussion highlights yet another problem that is related to the
familiar complaint that scholarly journals only bring to light statistically
significant results; we may be looking at a tail end of data in the first place.
Part III sets aside reasons to be nervous about imagined distributions and
focuses on one of the many reasons to question conclusions drawn from
relatively small data sets, as is typical in law and economics. A simple example suggests why this problem of Simpson's Paradoxes, or reversals, is
beguiling but also serious in the absence of a very large number of observations.

Part IV turns more directly to the partnership between data analysis
and theory. The discussion considers problems for which data suggests theories and, in contrast, where theories come first, and are then tested with
data. Some theoretical insights are so convincing that data testing, comforting even though flawed, may be unnecessary-and testing may, in any
event, be tainted because the decisionmakers who are observed are aware
of the theoretical insights, and able to respond to them. The discussion
concludes that we should expect empirical and theoretical work to evolve
in combination. The recent surge of empirical work in law and economics
will be slowed not only by the problems described in Parts I, II, and III, but
also by the exhaustion of theories that have been evaluated. Further empirical work will eventually require the development of new theories.
The analysis here repeatedly refers to the relative paucity of data
available to empiricists in law and economics. Statistical techniques often
involve sampling, whether intentional or forced, which is to say taking a set
of observations in order to say something about the larger pool of actual
events or potentially available observations.6 At times, the larger set will
be experienced in the future, while in other settings the smaller set is used
to predict the larger one because it is costly to gather data. In both cases
6.
Ever since William Gossett wanted to test the quality of the hops being used by Guinness, sampling and measuring errors has been the main source of employment for many a statisti-

cian. See Dan Kopf, The Guinness Brewer Who Revolutionized Statistics, PRICEONOMICS (Dec.
11,

2015),

https://priceonomics.com/the-guinness-brewer-who-revolutionized-statistics

[https://perma.cc/4KDW-X28H].
7.
planation,

PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 155, offer an excellent if counterintuitive exwhen discussing the "potential outcomes" framework deployed by modern
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there is the problem highlighted in Part I; the techniques that extrapolate
from a small set to a larger one make assumptions that are often false, and
trouble follows. The distribution of real-life data (and the errors thus identified in the subset) may be inconvenient for the empiricist. A good theory
can avoid this problem, but this requires data analysis to be guided, or at
least instigated, by a theory. It argues for moving from theory to data, rather than from data to theory (or no theory). Empirical work often tests
theories by testing over time, as time offers a means of setting aside data.
Unfortunately, this strategy brings on a new set of omitted variables,
simply because things change over time. Straightforward examples are provided to support these arguments, and they suggest that data science, at
least with respect to law and economics, is likely to experience its own scurve -a rise and then a fall, or a leveling off.
I. Questioning Empirical Work: Power Laws and Other Inconvenient
Distributions
It is plain that law and economics has left its first theoretical phase
and prioritized empirical work. The leading journals are now filled with
empirical work, and newcomers to the academy are likely to be trained in
empirical methods. With enticing claims about what their empirical work
suggests or proves, student-run journals have become useful partners in
the rush to overclaim and gain attention. In some fields, like corporate law,
international law, and criminal law, entry at the top is virtually impossible
econometricians. In testing whether a flu vaccine actually causes flu (as some critics suggest, because they observe that some people who take the vaccine do get the flu), they point to four possibilities, or groups, and call them: doomed, causative, preventive, and immune. Doomed means
they get the flu even if vaccinated. Causative means they get the flu only if they are vaccinated (as
alleged and now being tested). Preventive means the vaccination works with some significant
probability. Immune means they do not get the flu whether or not vaccinated. The genius is that
there is no need to worry about (and control for) every conceivable confounding variable. But the
critical assumption of this strategy is that the four groups are evenly balanced in the data, or divided in a known configuration. Without this balance or knowledge, we cannot say whether the
treatment and control groups are exchangeable. The very point is that counterfactuals are unobservable, so that the groups are surely unbalanced. Econometricians are left comparing apples and

oranges.
This example skirts around the additional problem created by unimaginedomitted variables. The vaccine may be dangerous for someone who consumes alcohol, or perhaps entirely effective for one who does not. In the language of the potential outcomes approach, there may be
other paths from A to X When omitted variables can be identified, they can be tested in order to
say something about causation between A and X But if the omitted variable is unanticipated, then
some theory is required to be comfortable with the idea of looming omitted variables. Imagine
again that we are testing whether A causes X, after observing a correlation between the two. B
and Cmight be relevant omitted variables, and we aim to find out whether B and Cprovide another path between A and X, so that the AXcorrelation does not mean that one causes the other.
We might find that A is attached to Bor that A is attached to BCwhen those two are both found.
We can now see whether A and Xconnect in the absence of B and C This is the genius of the
potential outcomes approach, but it requires some testing for the presence and absence of BC AX
may in fact be connected through EF, and if we are unaware of that possible connection, we cannot
test for it. It may be Ethat brings on X
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without empirical training and ambitions. Special attention is given to people who come equipped with good data sets, even when it is hard to say
anything definitive or novel with these sets and no new theory.8 This is the
age of empirical law and economics. In the beginning of this phase, correlations were revealed. To take a well-known example, a heavily examined
question in corporate law was whether the popularity of Delaware as a
state of incorporation was a "race to the bottom" or, through familiar competitive pressures, to the top.9 The empirical work began with two competing theories, and sought to declare one the winner. Early work revealed
that firms that moved to Delaware were more likely to experience a risein
market value rather than a drop, so that Delaware appeared to offer good
news for shareholders, rather than a race by migrating corporations to the
bottom-that is, to permissive state laws that enticed managers at the expense of shareholders, who presumably needed protection by federal law
or revisions in Delaware law.' 0 This was a victory for a serious theory, in
the sense that it was a view contrary to conventional wisdom.
However, as every statistics student learns, correlation is not causation. Perhaps there was indeed a race to the bottom, but migration to Delaware signaled a forthcoming corporate takeover that would benefit shareholders and overwhelm any decrease to be associated with managementfriendly Delaware law. The migrating firms might have done yet better in
the stock market if they had remained in their pre-Delaware states. It
would have been nice to have counterfactuals. Perhaps out of every 100
firms on their way to Delaware, there was some way to bar a significant
number of randomly chosen firms from relocating, and then to compare
the change in their market prices with those that relocated. Alternatively,
perhaps there was a way to isolate firms that relocated to Delaware and
did not merge-though it would be hard to know whether new and old
shareholders (incorrectly) anticipated a merger or other significant transaction. A generation or two later, the literature is still full of empirical work
on these causation questions. Over time it became generally accepted that
Delaware was good for shareholders, though there are enough confounding variables-including the availability of other states of incorporation,
the expected decisions of Delaware courts, and the intervention of federal
law-to keep corporate law scholars busy, and their readers exhausted."
8.
For one take on this, see Tom Ginsburg & Thomas J. Miles, Empiricismand the Rising
Incidence of Coauthorshipin Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1785. There is likely to be some pushback based on the likelihood that a focus on impressive data sets might be unfair because wellconnected young scholars have better access to data sets.
9.
Daniel R. Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Dela ware 's CorporationLa w, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982).
10.
For an explanation of these competing theories and a review of the associated early
empricial work, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Towardan Interest-GroupTheory

ofDelaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 nn.1-2 (1987).
11.
Early work, and the entire field, is best credited to Roberta Romano, but useful attractions include William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's
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Most empirical work in law and economics, and especially work that
tries to validate or invalidate claimed causal connections (whether a move
to Delaware will be good for shareholders, for instance), is regression analysis, a form of hypothesis testing (or rejection). Consider, for example, a
store (or army or prison) that wants to decide what size men's clothes to
stock. Over many years, the height of men has been recorded as they enter
military service, and we have learned that there is a normal (Bell curve)
distribution of heights around a (current) median of about 5'10". This classic example of a normal distribution means that the 2 5th and 7 5th percentiles
(2 inches shorter and taller as it turns out) have the same number of people,
and the 1 0 th and 9 0 th percentiles (4 inches) also match one another in size. 2
The same neat distribution holds for women, for people at different ages
of life, in different countries, and in different years, though the median
changes (it was 2 inches lower in the United States one hundred years ago,
and it is now higher in the Netherlands, and so forth). Our buyer might
need to adjust for the income of people expected to wear these uniforms,
but that too is easily done. If the buyer needed to acquire clothes to be used
many years in the future, the task gets harder, because the median height
has increased over time, and may continue to do so as recent immigrants
are encompassed. Increases in the median are usually thought to be the
result of diet and other factors,'1 3 and while it went through periods in which
the rate of this increase seemed regular or predictable, it now appears to
have leveled, and certainly to have slowed. This s-curve phenomenon (predictable and accelerated increase followed by a slowing increase and then
a leveling) is true of so many things that long-term predictions are nearly
impossible without some theory about the limits of growth. 4 There were,
by way of other examples, a rapid, exponential increase in the demand for
horses, and then for trains and for cars and eventually for aircraft, but in
the first of these examples demand eventually decreased rather steeply,
and in the third example it has leveled off. Note that some of these decreases, like empirical work itself, were accompanied by decreasing costs.
Bicycles and regressions might be cheaper to produce over time, and yet
they can decrease in importance because demand changes, as substitutes
ContinuingSuccess, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits ofDelaware Corporate Law: Internal Affairs, FederalForum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 Bus. LAW. 1319

(2020); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalismand the Structure of Corporate
&

Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Robert B. Thompson, Dela ware's Disclosure: Moving the
Line of Federal-StateCorporateRegulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167; Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsideringthe Competition over Corpo-

rate Charters,112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002).
12.
See Max Roser, Cameron Appel & Hannah Ritchie, Human Height, OUR WORLD
IN DATA (May 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/human-height [https://perma.cc/KZY9-8DXN].
13.
The language in the text is a bit imprecise in order to save space. The underlying
point is that we usually have evidence of correlation, and there is then some guesswork about
causation.
14.
See VACLAV SMIL, GROWTH: FROM MICROORGANISMS TO MEGACITIES (2019).
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become available or buyers learn that bicycles (or regression results) are
less useful than first imagined. S-curves can often be explained after the
fact, but exceptions abound. Few of us would bet that climate warming will
level off or decrease simply because the use of fuels that are currently popular is likely to level off.
Regression techniques are at their best when the real world that lies
"beneath" studied observations follows a linear pattern-either because it
is strictly linear or because it is exponential and can therefore be turned
into a linear pattern through a logarithmic transformation." For good reason, the regression line will be created with a technique that minimizes
least squares (of the errors, or observations, that do not exactly fit the line
revealed by the data).16
The major problem emphasized here is that common regression techniques work best with data that fits a straight line of the kind just described,
but requires serious adjustment if the underlying distribution is non-linear.
I will emphasize, or simply toss out in the interest of conserving words, two
variants from any convenient distribution, such as a straight line or a normal (Gaussian) distribution. First, actual distributions may follow power
(or scaling) laws, so that the tail (or even both tails) of a distribution is
much steeper than that found (or expected even) in an exponential growth
model. Power-law distributions are often traced back to Pareto's observation that 80% of Italian land was owned by 20% of its people, and then this
80/20 "rule" was (and still remains) noticed in an extraordinary number of
situations. Every business school student learns that 80% of a manufacturer's sales (and complaints!) comes from 20% of customers. Some readers are familiar with power laws like Zipf's law about the population of
cities (the largest is observed to be twice the size of the second largest, and
that second one is twice the size of the third largest and so forth), the prevalence of particular words in the written work of virtually all known languages, and even observations about the relative citations of academic articles. In these examples, the distributions are right skewed, and thus even
steeper at the tail than would be expected from a merely exponential function."

There is a substantial and fascinating literature on power laws, but for
present purposes the thing to see is fairly intuitive. It is that regressions, or
least-squared methods quite generally, will produce serious mistakes when
15.
Thus, if a worker's salary increases by 3% a year, the dollar increase in year 10 will
be much greater than that in year 2, but the lifetime income pattern can be formulated as a straight
line because of the regular 3% change. Linear regressions tend to be more useful than non-linear
curves for reasons that can be intuited but that are not critical here.
16.
In summary, minimizing least squares, when working with linear data under certain
assumptions, provides the best linear unbiased estimates. See Quinlan Lee, OLS, BLUE andthe
GaussMarkov Theorem, U. WATERLOO ECON. SOC'Y (Mar. 1, 2017), http://uweconsoc.com/olsblue-and-the-gauss-markov-theorem [https://perma.cc/4V3G-KHGT].
17.
For these and many other examples of power laws, see William J. Reed, The Pareto,
Zipfand OtherPowerLa ws, 74 ECON. LETTERS 15 (2001); and PER BAK, How NATURE WORKS:
THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1997).
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the tail of a distribution is steeper than expected. Errors will begin to fall
farther and farther from one side of the line fitted to the expected distribution, and the model will experience high heteroscedasticity. One way to
think about this is that if the empiricist is fitting a function to data with an
expectation of some exponential function at the tail, least squares-which
is the backbone of regression techniques and thus of empirical work in law
and economics-will do an increasingly poor job when that tail is really
much steeper than what was anticipated by observations marking an earlier shape of the distribution. The errors will be greater as we move along,
and each error (whether or not squared) adds bias to the fitted curve.
A yet easier way to think of this is that if only the regression technique
accounted for the presence of a power-law function, it could do a much
better job. But how do we, or the statistical packages used by beginners,'18
know when we are facing a power law or other inconvenient function? The
answer is that a theoryis required. Indeed, the power-law literature is full
of attempts to explain observed power laws. Some look for evolutionary
explanations1 9 and some to random-walk theory2 0 (which can present another problem for empiricists), but this is obviously not the place to convince the reader to share my fascination with power-law distributions. Instead, the point is that it is more important to understand why power-law

&

18.
Stata, SAS, R, and other regression software often require (depending on the type of
regression) additional coding packages which are user-written and circulated online.
19.
A famous example, Kleiber's Law, demonstrates both the explanatory significance
of power laws and the difficulty academics face when they identify such a law. Max Kleiber found
that animal metabolism, long known to be correlated with body size, scales at 3/4 power of the
animal's body size, contradicting the previous wisdom that metabolism scales at a 2/3 power, owing
to the relationship between surface area and volume (the way a 3x3x3 foot box contains 27 cubic
feet). Kleiber's law has since been refuted and reinvigorated countless times. See Karl J. Niklas
Ulrich Kutschera, Kleiber's Law: How the Fire of Life IgnitedDebate, Fueled Theory, andNeglected Plants as Model Organisms, 10 PLANT SIGNALING & BEHAV. 7 (2015). There is surely
some relationship between metabolic rates and body size (or surface area or perhaps a combination of the two), as theory suggests, but it is not clear that evolutionary pressure leads to a universal
relationship of the kind Kleiber announced. Moreover, at some point, the observations motivated
by Kleiber's Law, often suggesting log-log transformations where power-law distributions are to
be expected, smack of some retrofitting. After all, if we first try a linear regression, then a log
transformation, and then log-log transformations, eventually something will fit the available data
with some reasonable level of confidence, or so it seems. This appears to be what transpired, as
new data about previously ignored species toppled the previously announced law, or suggested
another. In any event, even after all these years, Kleiber's Law and its "exceptions" continue to
defy straightforward theories. Early observations suggested a particular distribution and helped
develop a convincing theory, and then further data challenged that theory but has not quite produced an improved theory. As is currently the case in law and economics, young empiricists were
complimented for the acquisition and development of new data sets, but the quest for a comprehensive theory regarding this relatively small question has not succeeded. The Kleiber's Law industry also presents an interesting counterexample to the familiar claim that "it takes a theory to
beat a theory."
20.
A well-known starting point is PAUL H. COOTNER, THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF
STOCK MARKET PRICES (1964). Random growth theory has also been applied to the hot topic of
growing income inequality at the right tail, though other theories, like super-star returns, currently
seem ascendant. Xavier Gabaix et al., The Dynamics of Inequality, 84 ECONOMETRICA 2071

(2016).
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(or other) distributions arise, in order to understand where else they might
be found. Without such theories, common regression techniques are misleading and the empiricist's conclusions will soon fail to replicate. In short,
regression techniques (with recognizable distributions) form the backbone
of empirical work in law and economics, and these regressions are often
unjustified-and likely lead to misleading results.
II. The Mistaken Assumption of Single Distributions
A second important reason to be skeptical of regressions, and especially so in law and economics, is that true distributions may change course
over time or over another variable. Instead of fitting a curve over all available data (even after strategically and perhaps unwisely excluding some
outliers2 1), so that many observations are shoved into one peg, in reality
these observations are likely to fit one pattern for one period of time. Then,
after some intervening event, the observations might fit another pattern,
depending perhaps on another identifiable variable (such as a different
time period). A theory is required in order to know whether to fit a curve
to all the available data, or rather to fit a curve to an identifiable subset of
the data, and then to expect a different distribution for the remainder. In
the process, the theory will identify the transition point at which we need
to begin the new distribution. This is easy to imagine if some, but only some
of the data, follows a power law. A curve may simultaneously fit the relatively flat tail (only the first part of the data) very well, but then be a poor
fit for the spike-end of the distribution. In artificial intelligence and other
fields, this is sometimes referred to as a "transition," meaning that beginning at some point, or subject to some variable, the data can be divided, or
split, in two or more parts, so that different distributions best fit the several
parts.
Note that this is more than a turning or inflection point. In the absence
of a theory or two, the empiricist will not know how to divide the treatment
and control groups, and unbalanced groups will be created. For example,
Pareto's original intuition about wealth distribution does not offer an excellent fit for subsequent data about wealth, and it has been observed that
21.
Omitting outliers haphazardly can be disastrous, especially when the assumed underlying distribution (typically a normal distribution for linear regressions) does not match up with
reality. See, e.g., Carlos Fajardo et al., One Needs to Be Careful When Dismissing Outliers:A
Realistic Example, U. TEX. EL PASO DEP'T OF COMPUTER SC1. (2016), https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2044&context=cs_techrep
[https://perma.cc/JYS2DY6V] (providing an example of a standard technique for omitting outliers that destroys the value
of available data); see also Harvey J. Motulsky & Ronald E. Brown, Detecting Outliers When
FittingData with NonlinearRegression-aNe wMethod Based on Robust NonlinearRegression
and the False DiscoveryRate, 7 BMC BIOINFORMATICS 123 (2006) (explaining the difficulties of
non-linear outlier omission and providing a possible solution). The empiricist can try to rely on a
method announced before observing the data set, can instead use personal judgment, or can try to
partner with a theory about the available data and issue.
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if one applies an exponential distribution to a majority of the population,
and then a power-law distribution just to the right tail, the overall fit is
superior.22 Two distributions are better than one, so to speak, and theorists
have worked on theories that explain or suggest this bifurcation. In law, we
might imagine that the distribution of data will follow one curve in some
states and a very different curve in others. Alternatively, data might follow
one curve before a certain date and another after it. Similarly, results might
follow a different distribution for serious crimes than for minor transgressions. Empiricists are quick to think of this claim as one calling for holding
the omitted variable constant, but this is not enough. The very distribution
of the data might be different on one side of the excluded variable than the
other. By different, I do not mean that the data is bimodal or multimodal,
for that describes situations in which there is a single distribution with several peaks. The problem instead is that data might, to repeat the earlier
example, follow a power-law distribution after a given event, or depending
on one or more variables, so that we need to look for (at least) two distributions: one "before" the event and one following it. But, we do not know
the dividing line without theory. 23 Some data is not necessarily better than
no data if the available data is inspected for the wrong thing.
Another way to think about this is to ask about the nature of omitted
variable problems. An empiricist might want to study whether increasing
expected prison sentences brings about a decrease in crime. Imagine that
the empiricist shows a strong relationship between threatened sentences
and crime rates. The work may have taken advantage of a natural experiment in which the legislature instituted more severe sentences that were
widely advertised. The implication is that, subject to various costs and benefits, it might (or might not) be worthwhile to increase penalties for convicted criminals. When such a finding is presented at an economics workshop, it is inevitable that most of the hands raised point to omitted
variables that might be critical. Perhaps there was more investment in police forces over time, and this is what discouraged criminal activity. Maybe
some prisons offered better job training or other conditions that made a
prison sentence less of a deterrent. Perhaps juries responded to the advertised increase in required sentences by being more likely to find defendants
innocent.

The empiricist will have foreseen many of these objections and will
have tried to test their influence with various regressions. In some
22.
See Thomas Lux, EmergentStatistical Wealth Distributionsin Simple MonetaryExchange Models: A CriticalReview, in ECONOPHYSICS OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS 51 (A.
Chatterjee et al., eds., 2005).
23.
To avoid retrofitting, there might be cases (like wealth distribution) where two distributions, and an apparent transition, seem to work well. With some imagination a theory can be
developed, and then tested on future data about wealth distributions. Again, the point here is not
to say that data is useless, but rather that data and theory working together, sometimes in one
order and sometimes in the other, is likely to be an important part of the future of law and eco-
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disciplines this is easier than in others, because there are many observations. Omitted variables cannot simply be tested on their own, because
there are likely to be joint and confounding effects among them. Variable
A might be important only when variable Bis also present, and variable C
might be offset by the presence of variable B, and so forth. The fewer the
observations, the more difficult it is to test these effects. Empiricists are
likely to compensate for this shortage of observations, and even for the
absence of any observations, with certain combinations of variables, by interpolations-but this requires some assumptions about underlying distributions.
To be sure, extrapolations and interpolations are reasonable when
there are straight lines to be imagined on the basis of theories. But with
zig-zags or other omitted variables that completely change the underlying
distribution on one side of the line to be filled in by interpolation, the process is misleading or simply impossible. This is especially so when the empirical work is said to have implications for further increases in prison sentences. There are many reasons to think that what is true about behavior
when a sentence is increased from three years to five, and then from five
to nine, will tell us little about what to expect for an increase from nine to
twelve years. Indeed, even if observations about increasing sentences from
three to five, and then from nine to twelve years, fit one familiar distribution, there is great room for error with a nonlinear regression when attempting to say something about an intermediate increase from five to nine
years, and especially so when this increase in sentence duration (and associated criminal behavior) is to take place in years following the studied observations.2 4 Unfortunately, it is common for empiricists to lump the entire
available sample, often for lack of a theory; this lumping is prone to reversal, a topic discussed in Part III. And if the empiricist tries to account for
years of prison in this example, it is likely that unobserved counterfactuals
come into play.
The larger point here is that the testing of omitted variables requires
one to identify, or even imagine, these variables, and thus to have a theory
of how the world works. Moreover, any test of the importance of a given
omitted variable requires the empiricist to have a theory about the underlying (real) distribution of data, if we had a full set of observations. The
latter problem can sometimes be handled with very large data sets-but
these are normally unavailable where law is concerned. Part III now turns
to another problem associated with limited data sets. The point will again
be that a good theory is required before saying much about a data set.

24.
Thus, if a single curve fits many increases in sentences over many years, at some point
it would be reasonable to think it unlikely that the increase in penalty following a change from
five to nine years would surprise us.
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III. Limited Data and Reversals

Most techniques for dealing with omitted variables require significant
amounts of data. Various paths among variables and outcomes need to be
examined.2 5 For example, in order to judge the importance of, or causal
relationship between, cigarette advertising and cancer, the empiricist
needs significant data to evaluate the degree to which advertising brings
about (or can discourage) smoking, and then the degree to which smoking
rather than genetic or environmental variables, or various combinations of
these variables, does the work. Serious scientists took many years to evaluate these connections and to be sure that cigarette advertising (and even
smoking) was harmful. They did this with very large data sets, but without
easy access to controlled experiments. In law and economics, we have
somewhat better opportunities for natural or controlled experiments, but,
unfortunately, we have at least as many variables to confront, and much
smaller data sets.
As a co-author and I have emphasized,2 6 relatively large data sets allow for the divison of data and, among other things, some circling around
omitted data concerns. When separated segments are small, any findings
are unlikely to be statistically significant. An interesting subset of this omitted variable problem concerns reversal paradoxes, where the empiricist
can fool us (and herself) into believing (not just the wrong strength of an
effect but even) the wrong direction of a variable's impact.
Imagine a firm looking to make an offer to one of two summer associates, Kim and Kit.27 The firm decides to score the associates on assignments given to them while they summer at the firm. During the first month
of the summer, Kit is given 1 extensive corporate assignment and deemed
to have done a poor job on it. Meanwhile, Kim is given 4 assignments in
that department and is graded as a success on 1 of them. During the second
month, the two are assigned to the environmental group. Kit receives 5
assignments and succeeds on 4. Kim is judged to have successfully completed the 2 assignments given in the same department. The firm tabulates
the reviews and decides to hire Kit because Kit impresses on 4 of the 6
assignments, while Kim impressed partners on just 3 of the 6. But then a
partner points out that perhaps the corporate assignments were simply
more difficult than the tasks judged by the environmental group (difficulty
is, after all, an omitted variable). Indeed, Kim performed better than Kit
on the corporate assignments, and also better than Kit on the environmental projects. Each department would prefer Kim over Kit, even though
Kit's overall score was superior. This is a classic reversal paradox. In this
25.
A surprisingly simple yet helpful way to conceptualize this is with causal models used
in combination with regression techniques. See PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 135-65.
26.
Fagan & Levmore, supra note 5.
27.
The example here extends one constructed in Fagan & Levmore, supra note 5, at 26-

28.
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example, the reversal easily came about because the summer associates
were not (and probably could not be) given the same assignments, and not
even the same number of assignments in each department. Note that a further, or double, reversal paradox is possible, once we allow for other omitted variables. Perhaps partners tend to give high scores in the morning, and
Kit was always evaluated in the afternoon. Had both candidates for employment been evaluated in the morning, it might have been Kit who
would have been thought superior in the morning and also in the afternoon, and indeed by both departments.
There is no end to the omitted variable problem, and its capacity to
change results. Even if Kim and Kit had been given the same assignments,
from the same partner and at the same time of day, reversal would continue
to be a danger because of the candidates' dissimilar innate abilities and
characteristics, as well as the mix of cases assigned to them, and the kind
of work the firm expects to have in the future. Kim may be bilingual and
able to complete immigration cases and cross-border tax cases more
quickly than Kit. But Kit may be better at managing work-life balance and
coping with stress than is Kim. Any model that omits variables that account
for those dissimilarities is fragile.
Again, it is common to question researchers about omitted variables.
In the little example offered here, designed to highlight the fragility of
models based on a small number of observations, when Kim is preferred
after the initial analysis of performance, someone whose intuition was to
favor Kit might have pointed out that Kit's assignments were more difficult
or that Kit was evaluated by partners who tended to be tough graders. If
the omitted variable were properly included, the result would have been
different. But in most cases this would mean that one department would
favor Kit over the declared winner, Kim. The overall scores might be different, with some disputes about how to weigh the factors that contributed
to these scores. The remarkable thing about the special case of a reversal
(or Simpson's) paradox is that an omitted variable causes both departments to favor one result, while the overall, combined score still favors the
opposite result, even when all known variables are included. The practical
and often startling lesson is that even when an empirical study is questioned because of some omitted variable, and that variable is included in
further study, the result may still favor Xover Y, even though Yis superior
to Xin settings for which data is available. This will not occur if one knows
exactly how to weigh one or more omitted variables, but the weight itself
is often unknown or unmeasurable and can be thought of as an additional
omitted variable. Assigning a weight or properly modeling a relationship
is often difficult, and it is hard or even impossible to know when it has been
done correctly.
Reversal paradoxes should be understood as a subset of the problem
of omitted variables, but it is a particularly interesting subset both because
of the startling reversals and because these problems are more difficult to
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solve than other omitted variable problems that can be decoded with additional testing and clever study design. In some cases the larger set of data
is what matters, and in other cases the divided data ought to carry the day.
In the example just offered, I think readers would have agreed that Kim
ought to be hired, once it was shown that both departments favored Kim;
agreement is less likely after the time-of-day variable is introduced. Dividing and validating data is a practice that avoids many problems in empirical
work, and it can reduce the risk of reversals. If there are 20,000 patients
with a disease, and a scientist wants to test combinations of drugs, it is usually wise to find the winning combination on a group of 10,000 randomly
chosen patients, and then test this finding by applying it to the previously
untested, or set-aside, 10,000. In the necessarily smaller case, if Kim and
Kit are evaluated over multiple summers and some term-time opportunities to work for the firm, and Kit earns higher total scores, it is less likely
that Kim was unknowingly given more difficult assignments or graders, or
was evaluated at an unlucky time of day, enough to reverse the result
reached by taking total scores.2 8 A hidden reversal paradox is less likely as
the number of comparisons increases. Note that what we think of as a conventional division (here, by law firm department or by summers, or both)
is hardly random, and there are many ways to divide the candidates' performances. Data division, followed by validation, is almost always a good
and workable idea when big data are available,29 but it is critical to have a
random division of the data. This has become a best practice in modern
data analysis, but it has not yet come to law and economics. The larger and
more obvious point is that law and economics empiricism is especially
likely to be unpleasantly surprised by reversal paradoxes because it often
makes use of relatively small data sets. The problem is acute when nonlinear regressions are in play.
IV. Theory-Data Interdependence
I have emphasized that the possibility of inconvenient distributions
and multiple and unforeseen omitted variables should cast doubt on many
conclusions normally attributed to empirical work. This Essay, like some
work in artificial intelligence, thus leads to the idea that data and theory
need to work together. 3 Data can show associations but not causation, unless the empiricist knows what to inspect. Even then, the empiricist faces
28.
Similarly, a track coach may seek the fastest runner for the team by averaging times
in a given race. One runner may have the lowest average time, but another may win when the
running path includes hills, when the weather is cool, when the race is run in the morning, and
when the race is run indoors. But there are other ways to divide the races, and these hidden variables can bring about reversals. But see infra note 29.
29.
Predictive models are generally trained and tested with set-aside data. Current techniques, such as k-fold cross-validation, split the data into a number of random partitions for estimating model performance; accuracy rates are assessed for each partition, or fold, to determine
adjustments to the model.
30.
See PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 349-53.
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an uphill climb. At the same time, the observation about data-theory interdependence raises the question of where theories come from, and also
points to the importance of asking whether a theory precedes or follows
data investigation.
In some cases a theory is so convincing that it can survive the difficulties of confirmatory data. A counterintuitive theory is probably more valuable than a counterintuitive and one-time empirical finding. Consider, for
example, the idea of "winner's curse." In a standard and familiar English
auction, the winner is the one who submits the highest bid, and only the
winner pays (the amount bid). It is likely that with many bidders, the median bidder's valuation is a good estimate of the market value of the item
up for auction. 31 As it turns out, this "wisdom of crowds" claim can be
demonstrated in a class to amazed or amused students with such regularity
that we might think of it as empricially verified by playing game after game
(with real money in order to avoid claims that fun games do not cast light
on the real world). In any event, if the median bidder is likely to arrive at
something close to the correct valuation, it is apparent that the high bidder,
or auction "winner," is likely to overvalue the item and bid up the price to
the point of overpayment.
More serious empirical evidence, away from a class of inexperienced
bidders with mixed motives, is difficult to obtain. For one thing, seasoned
participants will learn to adjust for the winner's curse; one who values an
item at twenty, might learn to bid only up to fifteen, depending on his experience in prior auctions or, if mathematically inclined, on his assessment
of the number of bidders and the distribution of expected values. Over
time, then, the winner's curse may disappear, or potential bidders may
learn from their mistakes and avoid auctions, up to the point where the
seller no longer uses auctions. The winner's curse logic is so strong that
empirical evidence is probably unnecessary. On the other hand, it is only
fair to note that the theoretical insight came about because of observations
in the field. 32
I feel obliged to point out that winner's curse as applied to reported
results is yet another reason to be skeptical of empirical claims. If empiricists are confident of a result when it meets some threshold, like a ninety31.
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (1988).
Winner's curse is an offshoot of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, an idea that may also be obviously
correct, once thought through, such that empirical verification is probably unnecessary. David
Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, InformationAggregation, Rationality, and the CondorcetJury

Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 34, 34-35 (1996).
32.
On the history of winner's curse and empirical observations leading to its formation
and then testing, see R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.
LIT. 699 (1987). When a passing observation inspires thoughtful analysis and then a new theory,
as it did in the case of winner's curse, we might say that a kind of bad empirical work (with no
controls, a small data set, and no division of data) brought about a theory (which turned out to be
difficult to test). This seems quite common, but it is an advertisement for intellectual curiosity
rather than for serious empirical work.
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five percent chance that the connection it finds is not the product of randomness, then it stands to reason that the finding overstates the likely existence of a non-random relationship. Along with the other problems noted
earlier in this Essay, it is easy to see why empirical law and economics is
likely to face a replication crisis. Some attempts at replication will fail because of previously omitted variables, some because of unrecognized
power-law (or other) distributions, and some because only a subset of results has been reported. 33 In the latter case, the replication crisis may seem
less serious, inasmuch as an effect is correctly identified, albeit misestimated. But where costs and benefits are concerned, the strength of an effect is important and misestimation may as well be considered part of a
replication problem. This can be thought of as a form of regression to the
mean; the advertised claim is likely to be an outlier. It is more meaningful
when the empiricist expresses confidence that x>y or that xis associated
with y, than when the empiricts says that every additional unit of vis likely
to bring about some number of units of w. The problem described here is
of course exacerbated by the familiar complaint about the difficulty of publishing papers showing statistically insignificant results. 34 The median paper is not the median statistical study. Moreover, it is difficult to adjust
correctly for this bias.
It is commonly believed that a theory, or hypothesis, has little value
unless it can be tested, but testing is often not easy. This reality devalues
empirical work at least as much as it casts doubt on theoretical claims. A
positive prediction is subect to the objection that some other variable
might explain an observed result. Similarly, a negative result does not
prove much if the proposed test is itself confounded by an unexpected
omitted variable. Thus, the theorist is frequently asked, "What would
prove you wrong?" and yet the unwanted result may not prove the theory
wrong if it is the product of an unanticipated variable.
To be sure, however imperfect empirical work may be, positive results
usually and correctly add to the likelihood that the theory is correct. We
can think of this as an example of Bayesian updating. If, for example, the
theorist claims that higher taxes will lead to less investment in a jurisdiction, and this is indeed observed, the skeptic might name a hundred other
reasons why investment declined. And yet, if multiple tests or natural experiments repeatedly show reduced investment, it is sensible to think that
the theory about the impact of higher taxes might indeed be correct. Causation has hardly been demonstrated to a thinking person's satisfaction,
but even the most skeptical observer will be less likely to wager that

33.
The need for replication might suggest an increase in demand for empirical work, and
along with decreasing costs of production, this might suggest that empirical work will increase
rather than decline in relative terms, as suggested here. On the other hand, it is rare for demand
to increase for things when they are shown to be of lower value than previously imagined.
34.
Ana Mlinarid et al., Dealingwith the Positive PublicationBias: Why You ShouldReally Publish Your Negative Results, 27 BIOCHEMIA MEDICA 3 (2017).
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investment will not decline the next time taxes are increased, even in previously untested jurisdictions.
It is plain that a theory can be made more attractive with supporting
data, despite the skeptic's objection that a regression result suffers from
some omitted variables. At the same time, a theory is often less easily rejected in the face of conflicting data. This is because an attractive theory
changes our perceptions, or priors, on its own. In any event, when theory
and data evolve together, our understanding of phenomena is improved.
Each one alone does some work, but data alone is unconvincing, while theory alone is, I believe, sometimes convincing - and especially so if it is difficult to think of a workable experiment or regression analysis that will
come close to bringing matters to rest. The most we can say is that theories
can be enhanced or disfavored because of empirical work, while data can
to a more limited degree suggest new theories that might be tested. In
terms of the evolution of law and economics, it is no accident that a generation of theorists was followed by a generation of empiricists. But in similar
fashion, a generation dominated by empiricists is soon likely to be followed
by a re-emergence of theorists. Ironically, this too is a theory that is not
easily tested. 35
It may be useful to offer a simple example, chosen almost at random,
from practical matters that law and economics would like to influence, in
order to demonstrate its practical importance. A defendant facing a serious
criminal charge would like to know whether to choose a bench trial or take
advantage of the right to a jury trial; similarly, in many civil cases there is
an opportunity to insist on a jury trial. 36 A typical empirical study would
show conviction (or civil liability) rates in various states, and try to say
something about when defendants should prefer bench trials. Conventional wisdom focuses on cases where a legal technicality might favor the
defendant and suggests that it is in these cases that a bench trial is to be
preferred. In civil cases, a sophisticated approach might look at the wealth
of the defendant, the results in previous cases assigned to a given judge,
and so forth. There is a large body of data, compared with many other decisions facing a litigant, but this volume quickly declines once the empiricist (or artificial intelligence), aiming to learn about the impact of a jury
trial, sets to work on the relevance of a particular factor, including the state
in which the trial is to take place; the gender of the defendant, plaintiff, or
judge; and the apparent social status of these parties, not to mention their
35.
One objection to this claim is that empirical methods have improved greatly over the
last generation (an undefined time period here), but it is hard to say the same thing about theories.
The common view that theorists in law and economics have plucked the low hanging fruit, and
this makes it more difficult for newcomers is, however, offset by the tendency of new empiricists
to over-claim in the interest of making a splash or getting accepted by law journals.
36.
See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When ProcessAffects Punishment:Differencesin Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trialin Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L.

REV. 959 (2005).
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choices of what to wear or how loudly to speak in court. Various empirical
studies also claim that the time of day matters, as might the political persuasion of the judge, the size of the jury, the selection of jury members, and
so forth. 37 The list of plausible variables is astonishingly great, and we must
take into account interactions among these variables. In addition, both the
jury and opposing counsel might learn something from whether a party
chooses to forego the right to a jury; it is easy to see that a party might in
some situations benefit by demonstrating that it has chosen or rejected a
jury trial with the flip of a coin. In a sense, the party is trying to correct for
what might be seen as selection bias.
It is noteworthy that what is typically at stake here is the question of
whether to settle a case or to accept a plea bargain, and these decisions are
not all-or-nothing, but surely depend on the size of the offer that is made.
On the one hand, this need to understand the scale of an effect suggests
why data alone is unlikely to get us very far. Moreover, an empiricist who
aims not to help one side or the other in these cases, but to improve the
legal system, faces an even greater problem. This empiricist wants to know
when juries are likely to reach the right result. In turn, this requires some
knowledge of whether a defendant was indeed guilty or negligent. This information is hard to obtain and makes the entire venture yet more difficult.
It is tempting to say that difficult questions about medicine are, for the
empiricist, far easier than the most straightforward binary questions in law.
Empiricists in law and economics seem likely to study these variables and
produce many doctoral degrees in the process, but it is doubtful that much
that is privately or socially useful will be learned other than a conclusion
that either overclaims or concludes that "further study is needed."
At the same time, this typical, or apparently straightforward, sort of
case (involving the decision to choose a jury trial), beginning with a relatively large data set, does not support the central claim of this Essay. I
aimed to show that theory and data need to work together, but the example
in this Part is no more supportive of theory than it has been of data. Theories, or hypotheses, about the impact of juries are easy to manufacturethough an "obvious" theory alone is unlikely to produce a doctoral degree
or a tenured position. No theorist gets much credit for a claim about why a
requirement of unanimity might be better for the defendant. And no theorist on her own gets any credit for opining that judges are more likely to
make certain decisions before or after lunch. It is too easy to state these
hypotheses before or after any empirical evidence, and indeed the first
claim is unlikely to get attention even if it comes with supporting empirical
evidence. Even a more surprising result can be shrugged off; if it could be
demonstrated that judge or jury decisions were influenced by time of day
37.
Unsurprisingly, these results get attention and are then often found not to replicate,
likely because of an omitted variable. With regard to the time of day claim about judging, see
Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factorsin the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi. U.S. E833 (2011).
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or gender, for instance, once judges learned of these claimed biases it is
likely that there would be some adjustment. As in the case of winner's
curse, or many theories (and empirical findings) in finance, the real test of
a result is whether it applies to set-aside, and in many cases to future, data.
The combination of all these difficulties suggests that an interesting (nonobvious) theory followed by the absence of repeatedly contrasting data is
an imperfect but promising way to think about the co-evolution of theory
and data in our quest to better understand law or to change it for the better.
Note that this Essay is not claiming that all questions are similar to the
question of jury choice. The jury example was chosen because it offers a
much larger set of data than is usually available to law and economics
scholars, and large data sets are often needed to overcome the problems
posed by omitted variables. I continue to have faith in theories like winner's curse, even though large data sets might prove to be tarnished, as
discussed earlier. The value of such theories comes from their surprise and
plausibility.
Conclusion
The aim here has not been to denigrate regressions, but rather to
make the case for the co-evolution, and even co-determination, of theoretical and empirical insights. Law and economics has come to be dominated
by regression analysis, and new entrants to the field more often than not
make their reputations with this subset of empirical work. Most of these
projects make questionable assumptions. When empiricists are challenged
about the assumptions implicit in their models, they often respond that
they are simply following the accepted practices in the field. In my own
experience, to question these models and the conclusions they suggest is to
be labeled as one who is hostile to empirical work and its ascendance. This
is unfortunate and unscientific.
The problems with empirical law and economics do not make a case
for unchallenged theoretical work. Weaknesses here do not make for victory there, in the realm of theory. From the beginning, theorists were challenged about their assumptions, even by generalists who needed no special
training in economics, but who are ill-equipped to challenge empirical
work on its terms. Empirically minded scholars insisted that a theory requires empirical evidence, usually in the form of a test that could be undertaken and that could demonstrate that the theory was false. Most of the
arguments in this Essay have been directed at empirical work, but these
challenges also mean that theories are weaker than might have been imagined because they cannot easily be shown to be true or false. Theories can
be imperfectly tested, and over time they gain or lose support. None of the
problems with empirical work makes the co-evolution of, or teamwork between, empirical and theoretical work magically immune from the challenges put forward here. It is more realistic to think that our confidence in
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theories as well as in empirical work will grow when the two work in partnership and point in the same direction.
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